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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for obstruction of justice, a first 
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)0) (West Supp. 2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant sat in a vehicle only five feet away from an adjacent car as four 
assailants argued and struggled with a drug dealer in the back seat of that car. 
The drug dealer was Defendant's friend and she had driven him to a church 
parking lot for what was supposed to be a drug deal, but turned out to be an 
-.(j) ambush. 
Defendant admitted to police that she thought her friend was being 
robbed and that she saw flashes as one of the assailants shot her friend. 
Although the sun was just starting to rise on that December morning, 
streetlights and other lighting illuminated the parking lot. 
As the assailants ran from the car after the shooting, Defendant realized 
·that she recognized some of them. She rolled down her window, called them 
by name, and invited them into her vehicle. As she did so she exclaimed 
"[W]hat have you guys done?" and "Oh my God." 
Defendant left her friend bleeding in the backseat of the car and drove off 
with three of the assailants. She quickly stopped, however, to pick up the 
fourth, who was the shooter. Once he was in her vehicle, Defendant asked if 
the assailants had killed her friend. The shooter replied that he shot the victim 
six times. The assailants joked with one another, no one directly threatened 
Defendant, and she admitted that she never saw a gun. 
Defendant also admitted to police that she viewed herself as "a second 
mom" to some of the assailants. She dropped them off at various locations in 
the valley and got help for one of them whose finger had been grazed by a 
bullet. Defendant also admitted to telling one of the assailants to report the car 
where the murder took place as stolen. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
la. Defense counsel proposed a mistake of fact jury instruction that the 
trial court refused to give. Although he objected to other instructions, defense 
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counsel did not object to Instruction 15, which generally discussed and defined 
the mental states of intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly. 
Did the proffer of a mistake of fact instruction preserve Defendant's 
appellate claim that Instruction 15 misstated the applicable mental state? 
_lb. Instruction 15 stated that the prosecution generally had to prove that 
Defendant acted intentionally or knowingly or recklessly and correctly defined 
each of those mental states. Instruction 19 then specified that Defendant had to 
act with the specific intent required by the obstruction statute. 
Was defense counsel ineffective for not objecting that Instruction 15 
misstated the applicable mental state? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to the issue of whether 
Defendant preserved this claim. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
\.ti> raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law. See State v. Ricks, 
2013 UT App 238, if 6, 745 Utah Adv. Rep. 54. 
2. After defense counsel agreed that the elements instruction correctly 
stated that the prosecution had to prove only that Defendant knew or should 
have known that she was obstructing a particular first degree felony, the trial 
court refused to give defense counsel's proffered mistake of fact instruction. 
Did defense counsel invite any error in the court's refusal to give the 
mistake of fact instruction? 
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Standard of Review. None applies. 
3. Was counsel ineffective for not moving for a directed verdict on the 
ground that the prosecution had not produced sufficient evidence that she 
obstructed justice? 
Standard of Review. See Issue 1. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-306 (West Supp. 2013) 
(obstruction of justice). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary off acts. 1 
The ambush 
Defendant, Benita Kennedy, sat in the driver's seat of her friend's Nissan 
Xterra SUV, looking down on a Chevrolet Malibu sedan.2 R184:18,25,91,121-
23;State' sExhibits(SE)6,10,13,22,23. The Malibu was backed into a parking stall 
behind a West Valley City church. R184:18,25;SE6,10. Defendant had pulled 
the Xterra nose first into the neighboring parking stall so that the driver's sides 
1 Consi~tent with well-established appellate standards, the State recites 
the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Kruger, 2000 
Ut 60, 12, 6 P.3d 1116. 
2 Defendant's nickname is "Silent" and some of the witnesses use that 
nickname in referring to her. R185:42,48. 
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of both cars were adjacent to each other. R185:39-40,64. The Xterra was only 
"about four or five feet away" from the Malibu. R185:39. 
Defendant drove to the church with the victim, Hiram Balbuena Torez, 
~ whose nickname was "Bullet." R184:120,123;R185:38-39,60. Torez was a drug 
dealer and had agreed to meet Eddie Garza at the church to sell Garza some 
methamphetamine. R185:9-10,12. 
Garza, whose nickname is "Ruckus," had other plans. R185:6,9-11,13,75-
76. Garza needed just "a couple hundred bucks" to throw a birthday party for 
his girlfriend's son. R185:9. Garza therefore planned to rob-or as he put it-
"lick" Torez. R185:10-11. Garza devised his plan with the help of Christian 
Lizarzaburu, Larry Davis, and the influence of some methamphetamine Garza 
already had on hand. R185:10-11,13,28,37,38. Neither Garza, Lizarzaburu, nor 
Davis had a gun, so Garza called Anthony Corona who did. R185:5,11,23,30. 
Corona's nickname is "Dopey." R185:48. 
Garza borrowed a Chevy Malibu that his cousin's roommate had rented. 
R184:109-10;R185:12,38. Garza drove to the church with Corona in the front 
passenger seat and Lizarzaburu and Davis in the back seat. R185:13-14,38-39. 
After Garza backed the Malibu into a parking stall behind the church, 
Lizarzaburu and Davis got out and hid behind a nearby maintenance shed, 
ready to help if something "went bad." R185:27,38-40. 
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The murder 
Torez got out of the Xterra and into the back seat of the Malibu. 
R185:14;SE12,13,14. Garza, Corona, and Torez began arguing. R184:56-
57,73;R185:14,40. Lizarzaburu and Davis ran to the Malibu, opened both rear 
passenger doors, and saw Garza struggling with Torez. R185:40,48,51. Garza 
told Corona to "Shoot the mother £-----." R185:48. Corona obeyed, shooting 
Torez six times. R185:14,40. One of the bullets grazed Garza's finger. R185:4-
5,15;R185:15SE25,26. 
Everyone but Torez ran from the Malibu. R185:40. Torez slumped in the 
backseat "holding his stomach and his chest" and pleading for help. 
R185:15;SE12,13,14. As Garza left the Malibu he told Torez, "Sorry, homey." 
R185:15. 
Corona took off towards the church. R185:16,30,41,55. Lizarzaburu, 
Davis, and Garza, were still near the Xterra. R184:131;R185:40-42. 
The getaway 
Much to their surprise, Defendant recognized the three. R185:40-42. She 
rolled down her window, called them by name, and told them to "get in." 
R184:131-32;R185:16,30,40-42. Defendant was exclaiming, "[W]hat have you 
guys done?" and "Oh my God." R184:131. As Defendant pulled away from the 
murder scene, the three told her to stop in the parking lot and pick up Corona, 
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who had run towards the front of the Church. R185:16. Defendant again rolled 
down her window and told Corona to "get in, get in, get in the car." R185:41. 
After Corona got in the Xterra, Defendant asked if they had killed Torez. 
~ R185:41. Corona replied that he shot Torez six times. R185:41. Corona's actual 
words were tha~ he "dumped on [Torez] with the .22." R185:41. Corona was 
the only one of the four with a gun. R185:55. 
As Defendant drove the four away from the murder scene, the 
conversation was jovial. R185:15,53. Garza "kind of laughed" about Corona 
having shot Garza's finger and "kept telling him, You f----n' shot me, fool." 
R185:15,17. Corona replied, "My bad, my bad." R185:15. Garza explained that 
he was "was just playing around" and telling Corona that he was going to shoot 
Corona's finger. R185:17. Lizarzaburu recalled that Corona threatened Garza 
~ to keep his mouth shut, but explained ¢at the two "talked like they were 
friends." R185:52-53. Lizarzaburu testified that Corona made no other threats 
and clarified that Corona made no" direct threat to [Defendant]." R185:52-53. 
As Defendant "pulled out" of the church parking lot, Garza called his 
girlfriend, who was at his cousin's house, and told je to tell his cousin and her 
roommate to report the rented Malibu as stolen. R184:111-12,114-16;R185:18. 
Two months after the shooting, Defendant told Garza's cousin that she was the 
one who told Garza to report the car as stolen. R184:110-11. Defendant told 
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Garza's cousin that Garza was "freaking out" about how to explain why he was 
not returning with the rented Malibu, and that Defendant told Garza to tell his 
cousin to report it as stolen. R184:110-12,114-16. Defendant also told Garza's 
cousin that Defendant "was going to take care of it and take the blame for 
everybody." R184:116. Garza's cousin's roommate reported the rented Malibu 
as stolen. R184:112. 
Defendant dropped Corona off first, "[r]ight after" the shooting. R185:55. 
She then dropped off Lizarzaburu and Davis "on the east side." R185:17,56. 
That left only Defendant and Garza in the Xterra. R185:56. 
Garza asked Defendant to drive him to pick up his girlfriend, who was at 
his cousin's house; Defendant obliged him. R184:lll;Rl85:17. There, Garza got 
out of the Xterra, went into his cousin's house, and tried to pacify his cousin 
and her roommate, who were upset that he had not returned with the rented 
Malibu. R185:18-19. Meanwhile, Defendant waited for Garza in the SUV. 
RlSS:18-19. 
Garza and his girlfriend then got in the Xterra and Defendant drove them 
to Garza's mother's home. R185:19. Garza went inside and got some extra 
clothes. R185:19. Garza then asked Defendant if he could borrow the Xterra to 
drive his girlfriend home. R185:19. Defendant again obliged and waited at 
Garza's mother's home for Garza to return. R185:19-20. 
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Defendant then suggested that she and Garza drive to see one of 
Defendant's "home girls," Natalie Jo Irish. R184:124-25;R185:19. At Irish's 
home, Defendant introduced Garza as her "friend" and explained that she was 
also a friend of his parents and had known Garza since he was young. 
R184:125-26,133. Defendant asked Irish to tend to Garza's injured finger. 
R184:125. Irish cleaned and bandaged Garza's finger and told him that he 
needed to go to the hospital. R184:125-26. Defendant then asked Irish to 
"please" give Garza a ride home and went downstairs to shower. 
R184:126;R185:19-20. 
R184:126;R185:19-20. 
Irish drove Garza back to his mother's home. 
The scene 
Defendant and Torez had arrived in the church parking lot around 6:15 
~ a.m. on Saturday, 10 December 2011. R184:15,38-39,77. Although it was dark, 
the parking lot was illuminated by "four main street lights" on the grass 
between the church and the rear parking lot. R185:58;SE17. The lights were the 
same type used to illuminate streets-overhanging lights set high on a pole. 
R185:72-73;SE4,6,7. Two other street lights also illuminated the parking lot and 
other lighting illuminated the church grounds and building. R184:59-61,67,77-
78;R185:58-59;SE2(C), 17. 
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The sun was just beginning to rise. R184:44,77. One of the first officers 
on the scene arrived about fifteen minutes later, at 6:31 a.m., and testified that 
there "was some ambient light at the time." R184:38-39,44. 
The Xterra that Defendant was driving belonged to her friend, Natalie Jo 
Irish. R184:121-24. The Xterra had tinted windows, but the tint on the front 
windows was no darker than is legally allowed. R184:121-22. A dark plastic 
rain guard covered the top portion of the front windows. R184:122-23;SE22. 
Despite the tinting and rain guard, Irish testified that "you can see fairly easy" 
out of the front driver's side window. R184:123. 
A couple whose backyard borders the parking lot behind the church 
testified that they heard a loud argument that morning coming from the 
direction of the parking lot. R184:55-57,71-73;SE2(B),2(C). They heard the 
argument even though their windows were closed. R184:56-57,73. Shortly after 
hearing the argument, the couple heard four to six gunshots. R184:56-57,74. 
They looked out their window and saw a man run across the grass towards the 
church. R184:57,74. They then saw an SUV drive off, stop, wait for the person 
to get in, and then drive off again. R184:57-58,63,75-77. The husband called 
police. R184:84. The police were dispatched at 6:25 a.m. R184:38-39. 
Officers Hamilton and Walsh were the first to arrive. R184:15,38-39. The 
Malibu's headlights were on. R184:39. The officers illuminated the Malibu with 
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the spotlights on their vehicles. R184:27,40. Officer Walsh testified that from 
150 feet away he could tell that someone was in the backseat of the Malibu. 
R184:44. He further testified that from about 10 feet away- or the distance of 
one full parking stall-he could "see actual blood on [ the victim's] shirt and 
jacket" and could tell that the victim had been shot. R184:42-44;SE10. Officer 
Hamilton testified that as he approached the Malibu, he could "clearly" see 
blood "[a]ll over" the victim's head and left side of his body. R184:25-26. The 
victim died. R184:25. 
Defendant's admissions 
Although Defendant did not testify, Detective Schwemmer interviewed 
her and testified to her admissions. R185:60-61. Defendant admitted to driving 
the victim to what she knew would be a drug deal. R185:62-63. She further 
admitted that she knew two of the people who were going to buy drugs from 
the victim, but she refused to tell the Detective their names. R185:62-63. 
Defendant admitted that after the victim got in the Malibu, she became 
puzzled about what was taking him so long. R185:64-65. Defendant admitted 
that she looked and "saw a struggle going on inside the car" and "thought" that 
the victim "might be getting robbed." R185:65. Defendant said that she then 
saw flashes and ducked down because she thought gunshots were being fired 
in her direction. R184:130-13;Rl85:65. 
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Defendant admitted that when she looked up, she "recognized the people 
that were there at that car." R185:66. Although Defendant said that she had 
initially feared that she would be killed, she realized "that was probably not 
going to happen" once she recognized the other individuals. R185:66. 
Defendant admitted that she "had" the other individuals "get in" the 
Xterra and that she drove them away from the scene and dropped them off at 
various locations. R185:66. She admitted that she never saw a gun while the 
individuals were in the Xterra. R185:66. She further admitted that she had 
known some of her passengers for years, had watched them grow up, and that 
she viewed herself as "a second mom to some of them." R185:66. 
Defendant twice told the detective that she did not have a cellphone and 
added that she had not had one "for quite some time." R185:64,69. But she also 
told the Detective that she was playing a game on her phone while she ~aited 
for the victim in the church parking lot. R185:68-69. 
Defendant's evidence 
Defense counsel elicited on cross-examination that Defendant was 
wearing a hooded sweatshirt that morning. R185:70. Counsel also elicited from 




Police found a handgun in the Malibu's backseat next to the victim. 
R184:102. A bullet was jammed in the chamber, another bullet was on the 
victim's leg, and another was on the backseat. R184:102. Irish t~stified that 
when the victim left with Defendant, he had a loaded handgun. R184:127. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State charged Defendant with one count of obstruction of justice, 
enhanced to a first degree felony because she acted in concert with two or more 
people. Rl-3. A jury convicted Defendant as charged. R89-90. She timely 
~ 
appeals. Rl 70. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Defendant did not preserve her argument that Instruction 15 
incorrectly instructed the jury on the applicable mental state. Defense counsel 
did not specifically object to Instruction 15, nor did he generally object to the 
explanation of the applicable mental state in the instructions as a whole. 
Counsel's request for a mistake of fact instruction did not preserve Defendant's 
challenge to Instruction 15. 
The invited error doctrine precludes appellate review of Defendant's 
plain error challenge to Instruction 15. Thus, Defendant can proceed only on a 
claim that her counsel was ineffective for not objecting to Instruction 15. 
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Defendant has not shown that her counsel was ineffective. Defendant 
has not shown that her counsel performed deficiently by not objecting to 
Instruction 15 because she has not shown that the instructions misstated the 
applicable mental state. Instruction 19-the elements instruction-explained 
that, to convict, the jury had to find that Defendant acted "[w]ith the intent to 
hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, 
conviction, or punishment of any person regarding a criminal offense." 
Instruction 15 did not contradict or otherwise confuse this requirement. 
Instruction 15 explained generally that Defendant had to act either 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, and then correctly defined each of those 
mental states. It did not state that any one of those mental states would be 
enough to establish guilt. Rather, Instruction 15 left it to Instruction 19 to 
explain how those mental states applied to the elements of obstruction of 
justice. In any event, any error would not have been so obvious that every 
reasonable attorney would have noticed and raised it in an objection. 
For similar reasons, Defendant has not demonstrated prejudice. 
Although she contended that she did not act with the requisite specific intent, 
the issue before the jury-given the evidence and argument-was whether or 
not she acted with the specific intent to obstruct justice. No one argued that 
Defendant could be convicted for only knowingly or recklessly obstructing 
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justice. Moreover, the evidence that she acted with the requisite specific intent 
was overwhelming. 
II. Defense counsel invited any error in the trial court's rejection of 
\@ Defendant's proposed mistake of fact instruction and Defendant does not argue 
that her counsel was ineffective for doing so. Therefore, this Court may not 
review this claim. In any event, Defendant could not show that her counsel was 
ineffective because the instructions correctly required the jury to find that she 
knew some crime had been committed. This is all that the obstruction statute 
requires. A separate instruction on a mistake of fact defense was therefore 
unnecessary. 
In order to fix the level of severity .of Defendant's obstruction conviction, 
Instruction 19 required the jury to find that Defendant knew or should have 
known that she was obstructing justice on particular first degree felonies. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that a finding that the defendant knew or should 
have known of the severity of the crime she was obstructing justice on is 
sufficient for fixing the severity of an obstruction of justice conviction. 
Therefore, a mistake of fact defense was inapplicable to this finding. 
III. This Court should not consider Defendant's claim that her counsel 
was ineffective for not moving for a directed verdict based on an alleged 
insufficiency in the evidence, because she fails to properly marshal the 
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evidence. Defendant omits several important facts and improperly argues the 
evidence from only her point of view, not in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. 
In any event, Defendant has not shown that her counsel could not have 
reasonably concluded that the evidence was more than adequate to survive a 
directed verdict motion. Defendant relies on the wrong standard for evaluating 
the sufficiency of the evidence .. The prosecution was not required to introduce 
evidence that would eliminate any reasonable hypothesis supporting 
innocence. Rather, the prosecution was required only to introduce believable 




DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE HER APPELLATE 
CHALLENGE TO INSTRUCTION 15 AND HAS NOT SHOWN 
THAT HER COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT 
OBJECTING TO THE INSTRUCTION3 
Obstruction of justice is a specific intent crime. To commit obstruction of 
justice, a person must do a prohibited act-which could include providing a 
person with transportation as a means of avoiding apprehension, harboring or 
concealing a person, or providing false information regarding a material aspect 
3 This Point responds to Defendant's Points I & IL 
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of an investigation-"with intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, 
. apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person regarding 
conduct that constitutes a criminal offense." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-306(1) 
~ (West Supp. 2013). 
Defendant argues that the jury instructions misled the jury about the 
correct mental state for obstruction. Br.Aplt. 12-19. She recognizes that 
Instruction 19- the elements instruction- duplicated the statutory language for 
the specific intent element. Br.Aplt. 18. She argues, however, that Instruction 
15-which generally defined the mental states of intentionally, knowingly, and 
recklessly-likely confused the jury into thinking that she could be found guilty 
if she merely acted knowingly or recklessly, instead of with the specific intent 
required by the statute. Br.Aplt. 12-19. 
Defendant treats this claim as preserved, but alternatively argues that the 
trial court plainly erred in giving Instruction 15 or that her counsel was 
ineffective for not objecting to it. Br.Aplt. 12-27. As explained below, 
Defendant's claim is not only unpreserved, but she invited any error by not 
objecting to the instruction after the trial court asked if counsel objected to the 
instructions. Defendant can therefore proceed only on her claim that counsel 
was ineffective for not objecting to Instruction 15. 
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Defendant cannot prevail on her ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
First, she has not shown deficient performance. Defendant has shown no error 
in the instructions' explanation of the applicable mental state. And, more 
importantly, even if there were some error in the instructions, it was not so 
obvious that every reasonable attorney would have noticed and objected to the 
error. Second, Defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice where she identifies no 
evidence or theory on which the jury could have found that she acted with 
anything other than the specific intent to obstruct justice. Moreover, the 
evidence that she acted with the specific intent to obstruct justice was 
overwhelming. 
A. Background. 
As explained, to commit obstruction of justice, a person must commit a 
prohibited act "with intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, 
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person regarding 
conduct that constitutes a criminal offense." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-306(1). 
The defendant need not know the specific crime or the level of offense on which 
she is obstructing justice. Rather, she need only know that some conduct that 
could constitute "a criminal offense" has occurred, and then act "with intent to 
hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, 




The obstruction statute states that it "is not a defense that the actor was 
unaware of the level of penalty for the conduct constituting an offense." Id. § 
76-8-306(4). 
Instruction 19 - the elements instruction - informed the jury that it could 
not convict Defendant of obstruction unless it found: 
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following elements of that 
offense: 
1. That on or about the 10th day of December, 2011, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Benita Kennedy; 
2. With the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the 
investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or 
punishment of any person regarding a criminal offense; 
3. Did one or more of the following: 
(a) altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed any item or 
other thing; or 
(b) harbored or concealed a person; or 
(c) provided a person with transportation, disguise, or other 
means of avoiding discovery or apprehension; or 
(d) warned any person of impending discovery or 
apprehension; or 
(e) provided false information regarding a suspect, a 
witness, the conduct constituting an offense, or any other 
material aspect of the investigation; and 
4. She knew or should have known the criminal offense was 
either criminal homicide murder, aggravated robbery, or discharge 
of a firearm causing serious bodily injury. 
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After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you 
are convinced that each and every element has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
GUILTY of Obstruction of Justice, as charged in Count I of the 
Information. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that one 
or more of these elements has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant NOT GUILTY of Count I 
of the Information. 
R121 (Addendum B contains the relevant jury instructions). 
Instruction 15 provided: 
As I stated in another instruction, the prosecution must prove 
that at the time the defendant acted, he/ she did so with a 
particular mental state. For each offense, the law defines what kind 
of mental state the defendant had to have, if any. 
For the crime(s) charged in this case, the defendant must have 
acted "intentionally" or "knowingly" or recklessly. The 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant acted intentionally or knowingly or recklessly before the 
def end ant can be found guilty of the crime charged. 
R117. Instruction 15 then stated t~e statutory definitions for those three mental 
states. R117. 
Defendant argues that Instruction 15 erroneously instructed the jury "that 
it 1nust convict [her] of obstruction of justice if it found that she 'acted 
intentionally or knowingly or recklessly."' Br.Aplt. 15 (quoting R117). She 
contends that because obsh·uction of justice is a specific intent crime, a person 
cannot commit obstruction "if he or she acts knowingly or recklessly but not 
intentionally." Br.Aplt 14-15. 
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Defendant acknowledges that the elements instruction-Instruction 19-
stated that to convict, the jury had to find that she acted with "the intent to 
hinder, delay, or prevent the apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or 
\@ punishment of any person regarding a criminal offense." Br.Aplt. 18; R121. She 
nevertheless contends that in light of Instruction 15, "the jury could have 
reasonably believed ... that Instruction 19's use of the term 'intent' included 
specific intent, knowledge, and recklessness." Br.Aplt. 18. 
Defendant argues in a footnote that she preserved this issue because her 
counsel submitted a mistake of fact instruction. Br.Aplt. at 20 n.2. 
Alternatively, she argues that the trial court plainly erred in giving Instruction 
15 and that her counsel was ineffective for not objecting to it. Br.Aplt. at 24-27. 
As explained below, Defendant's claim is unpreserved and Defendant 
~ has not demonstrated that any exception to the presen1ation rule applies. The 
invited error doctrine precludes review of her claim that the trial court plainly 
erred in giving Instruction 15. And Defendant has not demonstrated that her 
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to Instruction 15. 
B. Defendant's claim is unpreserved. 
Defendant's appellate challenge to Instruction 15 is unpreserved because 
she did not object to that instruction below. "'Generally speaking, a timely and 
specific objection must be made [at trial] in order to preserve an issue for 
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appeal."' State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ,r17, 192 P.3d 867 (quoting State v. Winfield, 
2006 UT 4, ~14, 128 P.3d 1171) (alteration in original). "Utah courts require 
specific objections in order to bring all claimed errors to the trial court's 
attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate." 
Id. (quoting State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct.App.1993)). Thus, an 
objection to one instruction or based on one ground does not preserve an 
appellate challenge to a different instruction or a challenge based on a different 
ground. See id. at ,,r17-18. 
Defendant did not object below to Instruction 15, let alone argue that it 
misstated the mental state. Defense counsel objected only to the instruction on 
the in-concert enhancement. R185:88-98. Counsel also offered a mistake of fact 
instruction that the trial court rejected. R185:96-97. But in arguing for a mistake 
of fact instruction, counsel never argued or even implied that Instruction 15 
misstated the applicable mental state. R185:96-97. In fact, when the trial court 
asked defense counsel for his objections to the instructions, counsel objected to 
other instructions but did not object to Instruction 15. R185:87-102 (Addendum 
C is the transcript pages discussing the jury instructions). 
Defense counsel's submission of a mistake of fact instruction preserved 
only a claim that Defendant was entitled to a mistake of fact instruction, not 
that there was some problem with Instruction 15' s discussion of the applicable 
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mental state. See Low, 2008 UT 58, ,r,r17-18. Defendant's challenge to 
Instruction 15 is therefore unpreserved. See id. 
C. The invited error doctrine precludes plain error review. 
Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred in giving Instruction 
15. Br.Aplt. 24-25. But this Court may not consider this argument because 
Defendant invited any error when he approved the jury instructions without 
~ 
objecting to Instruction 15. 
A '"party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that 
party led the trial court into committing the error."' State v. Cooper, 2011 UT 
App 234, ,I9, 261 P.3d 653 (quoting State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, if9, 86 P.3d 
~ 742). Therefore, "'a jury instruction may not be assigned as error even if such 
instruction constitutes manifest injustice if counsel, either by statement or act, 
~ affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury 
instruction."' Id. (quoting Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, if9). 
As explained, when asked for his objections to the jury instructions, trial 
.;; 
counsel raised other objections but never objected to Instruction 15. R185:87-
102. Counsel therefore invited any error in giving Instruction 15. See Cooper, 
:J) 
2011 UT App 234, ,I9. Consequently, this Court may not review Defendant's 
plain error argument. Id. ,rs. 
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D. Defendant has not demonstrated that her counsel was 
ineffective. 
Defendant alternatively argues that her counsel provided ineffective 
assistance when he did not object to Insh·uction 15. Br.Aplt. 26-27. To establish 
ineffective assistance, Defendant must demonstrate both that her counsel's 
performance was deficient and that she suffered prejudice as a result. See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984). She has not proven either 
Strickland element. 
1. No deficient performance. 
To establish deficient performance, Defendant must show that her 
"counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 
Id. at 688. Defendant argues that her counsel was deficient because there was 
no strategic reason to refrain from challenging Instruction 15. Br.Aplt. at 27. 
But the mere fact that counsel had no tactical basis to forgo an objection to 
Instruction 15 does not demonstrate deficient performance. 
The fact that a particular action lacks a strategic motivation does not 
make it unreasonable as a matter of law. The ultimate inquiry under 
Strickland's deficient performance prong "is not whether counsel's choices were 
strategic, but whether they were reasonable." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 
481 (2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Strickland inquires "into the 
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objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state 
of mind." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 790 (2011). 
Because Strickland is grounded in reasonableness, it asks only "whether 
G;> an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence under 'prevailing 
professional norms,' not whether it deviated from best practices or most 
common custom." Hanington, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (quoting St1ickland, 466 
U.S. at 690). The Sixth Amendment requires only that counsel's representation 
be "objectively reasonable, not flawless or to the highest degree of skill." Dows 
v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir. 2000). "In order to pass constitutional 
muster, counsel need not discover every possible item of information before 
trial, make every possible objection during trial, or use every h·ial tactic which 
petitioner would in retrospect, now require." Wilcoxson v. State, 22 S.W.3d 289, 
\ti) 304 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (quotation and citation omitted). 
Thus, counsel cannot be deficient merely because he did not consider and 
reject an objection or argument for strategic reasons. See Bullock v. Carver, 297 
F.3d 1036, 1048 (10th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that attorney's ignorance of a claim 
or lack of strategic choice will not, by itself, demonstrate objectively 
umeasonable representation). Rather, to prove objectively umeasonable 
representation, a defendant must show that no reasonable counsel would have 
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overlooked the objection or argument. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
Defendant has not done so. G 
a. The jury instructions correctly stated the applicable 
mental state. 
As explained, to commit obstruction of justice, one must commit a 
prohibited act "with intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, 
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person regarding 
conduct that constitutes a criminal offense." Id. § 76-8-306(1). Instruction 19-
the elements instruction- correctly required the jury to find that Defendant 
acted with the requisite specific intent. It required the jury to find that 
Defendant acted "[w]ith the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, 
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment or any person regarding 
a criminal offense." R121 ( emphasis added). 
Contrary to Defendant's argument, Instruction 15 did not change or 
confuse Instruction 19' s clear statement of the specific intent requirement. 
Although Instruction 15 told the jury that the mental states of intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly could generally apply, it did not explain how those 
mental states applied to the specific elements of obstruction. R117. Rather, 
Instruction 15 left that to Instruction 19, which, as explained, correctly stated 
that the jury had to find that Defendant acted with the requisite specific intent. 
R121. 
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The jury would have looked to lnsh·uction 19, not Instruction 15, to 
understand which mental state it had to find in relation to the specific elements 
of obstruction. The jury would have done so because Instruction 19 specifically 
explained how the mental states applied to each element of obstruction while 
Instruction 15 did not. 
Instruction 15 did not state that all three of its listed mental states could 
apply to each of the elements of obstruction. R117. Nor, as Defendant claims, 
did it state that the jury "must convict" if it found that Defendant "' acted 
intentionally or knowingly or recklessly."' Br.Aplt. 15 (quoting R117). Rather, it 
stated only that the prosecution would have to prove one or more of these 
mental states before the jury could convict. R117. 
Although obstruction is a specific intent crime, Instruction 15' s reference 
~ to other mental states was not out of place. While obstruction requires a 
defendant to act with a specific intent, the intentional mental state is not the 
only relevant mental state. The obstruction statute's specific intent requirement 
includes a "knowing" component. It presupposes that a defendant know that 
conduct constituting some criminal offense has occurred. UTAH CODE ANN. § 
i.iJ 
76-8-306(1). While a defendant need not know the specific crime for which she 
is obstructing justice, she does need to know that some criminal conduct has 
occurred, and then act with the intent to obstruct "the investigation, 
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apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person regarding" 
that conduct. Id. While that conduct must" constitute[] a criminal offense," the 
statute does not require that the defendant know which offense. See id. 
Otherwise, defendants could escape liability merely by claiming ignorance of 
the law. 
And while a defendant must know that some criminal conduct has 
occurred, the obstruction statute does not require her to know the level of 
severity of the crime for which she is obstructing justice. Although the severity 
of an obstruction conviction depends on the severity of the crime that a 
defendant obstructs, it "is not a defense that the actor was unaware of the level 
of penalty for the conduct constituting an offense." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-
306(3), (4). Thus, to obstruct justice, a defendant need only commit a prohibited 
act "with intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person regarding conduct that 
constitutes" some criminal offense, whatever it might be. Id. 
Instruction 19's requirement that the jury find that Defendant "knew or 
should have known the criminal offense was" a particular first degree felony 
also made the knowing mental state referred to in Instruction 15 relevant. 
Although not required by the obstruction statute, Instruction 19 required the 
jury to find that Defendant knew the specific crime on which she was 
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obstructing justice. Presumably the prosecution included this element so that 
the verdict would make it clear that Defendant was not obstructing justice on 
the drug deal that had been arranged, but rather on one of the first degree 
~ felonies listed in Instruction 19.4 R121. 
In sum, both the intentional and knowing mental states applied to the 
elements of obstruction in this case. Thus, Instruction 15's general reference to 
both of these mental states was not erroneous. 
Recklessness :was not an applicable mental state. But its inclusion in 
Instruction 15 did not misstate or confuse the specific intent element in 
Instruction 19. Rather, because Instruction 19 did not mention recklessness as 
an applicable mental state, the jury would have seen Instruction 15' s mention of 
recklessness as irrelevant surplusage. Again, because nothing in Instruction 15 
~ stated that every listed mental state applied to every element in Instruction 19, 
the jury would have seen Instruction 15 as providing only a general list of 
possible mental states. The jury would have relied on Instruction 19 to 
understand which mental state applied to which element. 
Defendant argues that Instruction 19 did not resolve the confusion that 
she perceives Instruction 15 created because, although Instruction 19 states that 
4 Each of those crimes is a first degree felony. See Utah Code Ann.§§ 76-
5-203(3)(a) (West Supp. 2013) (murder); 76-6-302(2) (West 2004)(aggravated 
robbery); 76-10-508.1(3) (West Supp. 2013) (discharge of a firearm). 
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the jury had to find that she acted with "the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent 
the investigation, apprehension, conviction, or punishment of any person 
regarding a criminal offense," Instruction 19 did not "specify what kind of 
intent was required." Br.Aplt. 18. She argues that the jury would have read the 
term "intent" in Instruction 19 to ''include specific intent, knowledge, and 
recklessness." Br.Aplt. 18. Defendant is incorrect. While a lawyer might read 
Instruction 19 that way, a jury would not. 
Defendant misreads Instruction 19's use of the word "intent." She reads 
it as a term of art referring to any mental state. Lawyers and judges sometimes 
use the term "intent" in that artful sense. See State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ,r43, 243 
P.3d 1250 (recognizing that "intent" can be a term of art n1eaning the '" state of 
mind accompanying an act"') (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 881 (9th ed. 2009)). 
But that is not how Instruction 19 used "intent." Rather, it used the term 
to refer to one of the specific "mental states" that Instruction 15 defined. 
Instruction 19 did not state that Defendant had to act with an intent. R121. 
Rather it stated that Defendant had to act with "the intent to hinder, delay, or 
prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or 
punishment of any person regarding a criminal offense." R121 (emphasis 
added). 
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Thus, the jurors would not have read Instruction 19' s reference to acting 
"[w]ith the intent to hinder, delay or prevent" as a general reference to any of 
the mental states defined in Instruction 15. Rather, they would have 
understood Instruction 19 to be referencing the specific mental state of "intent" 
that Instruction 15 correctly defined. Instruction 15 stated that a "person 
engages in conduct intentionally or with intent or willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Rl 17 
(emphasis added). 
It is well-established that jurors '" do not sit in solitary isolation booths 
parsing instructions for subtle shades of meaning in the same way that lawyers 
might."' State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ,125, 285 P.3d 1183 (quoting Boyde v. 
~ California, 494 U.S. 370, 380-81 (1990). Instead, "'[d]ifferences among [jurors] in 
interpretation of instructions may be thrashed out in the deliberative process, 
with commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has 
taken place at the trial likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting.111 Id. 
(quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 381). Both the prosecutor and defense counsel 
repeatedly emphasized that Defendant had to act with the specific intent 
required by the obstruction statute and quoted that language from Instruction 
19. R184:13-14;R185:118-19,131. Given the plain language of Instruction 19 and 
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the evidence and arguments at trial, the jury would not have read Instruction 19 
as Defendant now proposes. 
In sum, Instruction 19 correctly informed the jury that Defendant had to 
act with the requisite specific intent. Instruction 15 did not change or confuse 
Instruction 19's direction. Because the instructions correctly instructed the jury 
on the specific intent element, any objection to Instruction 15 would have been 
futile. Consequently, Defendant has not shown that her counsel was deficient 
for not objecting to Instruction 15. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 126, 1 P.3d 546 
(counsel is not deficient for forgoing a futile objection). 
b. Any error was not so obvious that counsel was objectively 
unreasonable for not raising it. 
But even assuming that Instruction 15 was sufficiently problematic that 
an objection would not have been entirely futile, Defendant still has not shown 
deficient performance. Because Instruction 19 correctly stated the specific intent 
element, any ambiguity created by Instruction 15 was not so obvious that all 
reasonable counsel would have noticed and objected to the error. Indeed, 
neither the prosecutor nor the trial court identified the issue that Defendant 
now raises. Moreover, no one argued that Defendant could be convicted for 
only knowingly or recklessly obstructing justice. R184:13-14;R185:118-19,131. 
Thus, Defendant has not shown that any error was so obvious that her counsel's 
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lack of objection was objectively unreasonable and therefore deficient. See 
Strickland,-466 U.S. at 688. 
2. No prejudice. 
For many of the same reasons, Defendant also has not established 
prejudice. To prove the prejudice element of her ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, Defendant must show "a reasonable probability" that but for 
counsel's performance, "the result of the proceeding would have been 
different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. Proof of prejudice 
"must be a demonstrable reality," not mere speculation. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 
P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). Errors that have an "isolated" or "trivial effect" on 
the verdict are not prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96. Even where a jury 
~ instruction is "susceptible to a misreading," the error may nevertheless be 
harntless in light of the evidence. See Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ,I,I24-28. 
Any possibility that the jury convicted Defendant because she acted with 
something less than the requisite specific intent is purely theoretical and 
therefore speculative. There was no basis in the evidence or the arguments for 
the jury to find that Defendant acted with anything other than the specific 
intent to obstruct justice. 
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As Defendant explains, her defense theory had two parts. Br.Aplt. 21-22. 
First, her counsel argued that Defendant did not know that a crime had been 
committed given the dark conditions, the tinted windows, and her being 
distracted by listening to music and playing a game on her phone. 
R184:13;R185:129-32. Second, counsel argued that if Defendant did know a 
crime had been committed, she was still innocent because she was coerced into 
helping the perpetrators flee given that she believed she was shot at and Corona 
was making threats as Defendant drove him and the others away. R185:132-
33,137. The trial court instructed the jury on the defense of coercion. R120. 
The prosecutor argued that Defendant knew that a crime had been 
committed because she was mere feet away when Corona shot the victim six 
times, she noticed the struggle in the Malibu, saw the gun flashes, rolled down 
her window, left without the person she had driven to the church parking lot, 
and told Garza to report the Malibu as stolen. RlBS:118-19,120-23. The 
prosecutor also argued that Defendant was not coerced because she knew the 
perpetrators and admitted that she no longer feared them once she recognized 
them, she stopped to pick up the only person with a gun, she dropped him off 
first, and she then continued to help the others. R185:123-24. 
During their closing arguments, both defense counsel and the prosecutor 
emphasized Instruction 19's specific intent element. Both attorneys quoted that 
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r-. ~ 
element to the jury. R185:118,131. The prosecutor further explained that, to 
commit obstruction, Defendant had to be "acting with that intent" when she 
provided the perpetrators with transportation, harbored them, and instructed 
Garza to tell his cousin and her roommate to report the Malibu as stolen. 
R185:118-19. The prosecutor never argued that Defendant acted with anything 
less than the requisite specific intent. RlBS:117-27,138-42. 
While it is true that Defendant's intent was at issue, the dispute was not 
about the level of Defendant's mental state-Le. whether she acted 
intentionally, or knowingly or recklessly. Rather, the issue before the jury was 
whether Defendant acted with the requisite specific intent or not. There was no 
basis in the evidence or arguments to find that Defendant only acted knowingly 
or recklessly with respect to her purpose in driving the four assailants from the 
murder scene and continuing to help them. 
Moreover, the evidence that Defendant knew that a first degree felony 
had been committed and acted to obstruct justice on that crime was 
overwhelming. Defendant was only five feet away when the assailants argued 
and struggled with the victim and when Corona shot the victim six times. 
R185:39,41. Streetlights and other lighting illuminated the parking lot. 
R185:58;SE17. Defendant admitted that she saw the sh·uggle and the flashes 
from the gunshots and that she "thought" the victim "might be getting robbed." 
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R185:65. The victim's gunshot wounds and bloody body were visible from ten 
feet away. R184:25-26,42-44. Although there was some evidence that 
Defendant was listening to music and playing a game on a cellphone, she twice 
told the Detective that she did not have a phone. R185:64,69. The argument 
and gunshots were loud enough that people in a home behind the church could 
hear them through their closed windows. R184:56-57,73. 
Defendant rolled down her car window and called some of the assailants 
by name after recognizing them. R185:40-42. She invited them to get into her 
car. R185:40-42. Defendant began to drive off with three of the assailants but 
then stopped to pick up the fourth assailant, Corona, who was the only one 
with a gun. R185:16,41,55. 
Defendant's exclamations "[W)hat have you guys done?" and "Oh my 
God," showed that she knew a serious crime had been committed. R184:131. 
Defendant suspected that the assailants had committed murder, because she 
asked them if they had killed the victim. R185:41. Any doubt that Defendant 
had about the victim's fate was resolved when Corona responded to 
Defendant's question by saying that he shot the victim six times. R185:41. 
The fact that the four assailants ambushed and attacked one victim 
undermined any claim that the assailants were merely acting in self-defense. 




that the victim was pleading for help, that Garza told the victim 11Sorry, homey" 
as Garza got out of the car, and the jovial mood in Defendant's vehicle. 
R185:15,17,52-53. Corona and Garza were joking with each other, and although 
Corona threatened Garza to keep his mouth shut, the two "talked like they 
were friends." R185:52-53. No one directly threatened Defendant and she 
admitted she never saw a gun. R185:52-53,66. 
Defendant also admitted that she told Garza to tell his cousin and her 
roommate to report the rented Malibu as stolen. R184:110-11. Defendant also 
admitted that she viewed herself as "a second mom to some" of the assailants. 
R185:66. She dropped them off at various locations and got help for Garza's 
injured finger. R184:125-26,133;R185:17,19,55-56. Most significantly, Defendant 
drove away without the victim, even though she had driven him to the church 
~ parking lot. R185:16,30,40-42. 
Any error in the instructions was harmless in light of this overwhelming 
evidence. Even without Instruction 15, there is no reasonable likelihood that 
the jury would not have found that Defendant acted with the specific intent to 
obstruct justice. In light of the evidence and arguments, and the jury's rejection 
of Defendant's coercion claim, any susceptibility to misreading in the 
instructions was not sufficient to create a reasonable probability of a different 
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outcome. See Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ,r2s. Consequently, Defendant has not 
shown that she suffered any prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S 
MISTAKE OF FACT INSTRUCTION5 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously refused her request for 
a jury instruction explaining a mistake of fact defense. Br.Aplt. 27-33. She 
argues that such an instruction was necessary because obstruction requires that 
the defendant know that a crime has been committed. Br.Aplt. 29·_33_ 
Defendant argues that here, Instruction 19 allowed the jury to convict her if she 
only II should have known" that a crime was committed. Br.Aplt. 29-33. She 
argues that her proposed mistake of fact instruction would have corrected this 
flaw in the instructions. Br.Aplt. 29-33. 
A. Defendant invited any error in the rejection of her mistake of fact 
instruction. 
This Court should not review this claim because defense counsel invited 
any error in the trial court's refusal to give a mistake of fact instruction. As 
stated, a II party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that 
party led the trial court into committing the error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
5 This Point responds to Defendant's Point III. 
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Defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury that "it is a defense to 
the charge of Obstruction of Justice, if the defendant had an honest belief that 
the following crimes had not occurred 1. Criminal Homicide murder, 2. 
(;) Aggravated Robbery, 3. Discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily injury." 
R95 (Addendum D is a copy of the proposed instruction). The prosecutor 
objected to the instruction on the ground that Instruction 19' s requirement that 
the jury find that Defendant "knew or should have known a crime had been 
committed" negated Defendant's mistake of fact defense. R185:96. 
Defense counsel conceded that Instruction 19's requirement that 
Defendant knew or "should have known" that a particular crime was 
committed was a proper element of obstruction of justice. R185:97. The trial 
court found that counsel's concession, "negate[d]" the need for a mistake of fact 
~ instruction. R185:97. The court explained that "based on the element of 'known 
or should have known' that you've agreed is an accurate statement of the law[,] 
[t]his is not an appropriate instruction."6 R185:97. 
As the trial court found, defense counsel's concession that Instruction 19's 
"knew or should have known" element accurately stated the law was a 
6 Defendant argues that the trial court did not explain why it refused to 
give her mistake of fact instruction. Br.Aplt.29. On the contrary, the trial court 
stated that it rejected the instruction because defense counsel conceded that an 
element of obstruction was that Defendant knew or should have known that 
one of the specific crimes had been committed. R185:97. 
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concession that a mistake of fact instruction was unnecessary. R185:97. 
Counsel therefore invited any error in the trial court's refusal to give her 
requested instruction. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220. Defendant does not argue that 
her counsel was ineffective in making this concession. Br.Aplt. 27-33. 
Therefore, this Court may not review this claim. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1221. 
B. Defendant could not show that her counsel was ineffective. 
Even if Defendant had argued that her counsel was ineffective, she could 
not succeed on that claim because the instructions correctly instructed the jury 
on the elements of obstruction and thereby rendered a mistake of fact 
instruction unnecessary. As explained in Point I, to commit obstruction of 
justice, a person has to know that some crime has been committed. See Point 
I.D.1.a. Otherwise, the person cannot act with the requisite specific intent to 
"hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, 
conviction, or punishment of any person regarding a criminal offense." See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-306(1). But the obstruction statute does not require 
that the Defendant know what offense or what degree of offense was 
committed. See id. Although the degree of an obstruction conviction is based 
on the degree of the offense on which the defendant obstructs justice, lack of 
knowledge of the specific degree of offense is not a defense. see id. § 76-8-306(3), 
(4). 
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Instruction 19's specific intent element required the jury to find that 
Defendant knew that some crime had been committed. The jury could not have 
found that Defendant acted "with intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the 
~ investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any 
person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense" without finding 
that Defendant knew that some criminal conduct had occurred. See UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 76-8-306(1). Thus, it was unnecessary to separately instruct the jury in a 
mistake of fact instruction that it should acquit if Defendant did not know that 
some crime had been committed. 
Although the obstruction statute did not require the jury to also find that 
Defendant knew the specific offense on which she was obstructing justice, 
Instruction 19's explanation of that requirement in terms of what the defendant 
~ knew or "should have known" was not improper. R121. As Defendant 
recognizes, the Utah Supreme Court has held that when the severity of a 
conviction for obstruction of justice depends on the defendant's knowledge that 
she obstructed justice on a particular crime, it is enough to show that the 
defendant knew, or should have known that a particular crime was committed. 
See State v. Bingham, 575 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah 1978); Br.Aplt 39 n.5. Because it is 
enough-for purposes of fixing the severity of an obstruction conviction-that a 
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defendant should have known the severity of the crime on which she was 
obstructing justice, a mistake of fact defense could not have applied. 
Bingham interpreted a prior version of the obstruction statute that 
included a specific intent element nearly identical to that in the current version 
of the statute. See id. at 198 n.1. That element provided that a defendant 
obstructs justice if "with intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, 
apprehension, ... of another for the commission of a crime, he: (c) Provides the 
offender ... transportation ... for avoiding discovery of apprehension." Id. 
(quoting the version of UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-8-306(1) then in effect). 
But unlike the current version of the obstruction statute, the version at 
issue in Bingham classified obstruction as "a class B misdemeanor unless the 
actor knows that the offender cmnmitted a capital offense or a felony of the first 
degree, in which case it is a felony of the second degree." Id. at 198; UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 76-8-306(4) (West Supp. 2013) (providing that it "is not a defense that the 
actor was unaware of the level of penalty for the conduct constituting an 
offense"). 
Like Defendant in this case, Bingham helped two friends flee the scene of 
a shooting. Id. at 198. Bingham and his friends were walking towards two 
other men to confront them about a previous altercation when Bingham noticed 
that one of his friends had a gun. Id. at 198. Wanting "no part of it," Bingha1n 
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turned around; as he walked back to his car, he heard two shots. Id. His friends 
then returned to his car, Bingham bent his rear license plate so that it could not 
be read, and drove his friends away. Id. Bingham's friend had shot and killed 
one man and wounded the other. Id. 
Bingham was convicted of obstruction as a second degree felony based 
on a finding that he knew a capital offense or first degree felony had been 
committed. Id. He argued on appeal that the evidence did not show that he 
possessed that knowledge. Id. 
In analyzing Bingham's claim that he did not know the particular offense 
on which he was obstructing justice, the Utah Supreme Court held that "all the 
state should be required to prove is that [a defendant] either knew, or should 
have known, that such a capital offense or felony in the first degree had been 
~ committed, and then" acted with the specific intent to obstruct justice. Id. at 
199. The Court held that because all "that was affirmatively shown was that 
[Bingham] heard the shots, then assisted the offender in getting away from the 
scene," the evidence was insufficient to establish "beyond a reasonable doubt 
that [Bingham] knew or should have known that a homicide had been 
committed." Id. The court therefore reduced his obstruction conviction to a 
misdemeanor. Id. Thus, Bingham establishes that when the severity of an 
obstruction conviction depends on the defendant's knowledge that a specific 
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crime was committed, it is enough to show that the defendant "either knew, or 
should have known" what that particular offense was. See id. 
Here, Instruction 19's requirement that Defendant "knew or should have 
known" that one of the listed first degree felonies had been committed was 
correct under Bingham. R121. Because controlling law rendered a mistake of 
fact defense inapplicable to this particular provision in Instruction 19, any claim 
that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to that provision would 
necessarily fail. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1228 ("To establish a claim of 
ineffectiveness based on an oversight or misreading of law, a defendant bears 
the burden of demonstrating why, on the basis of the law in effect at the time of 
trial, his or her trial counsel's performance was deficient."). 
In su1n, to establish the level of severity of an obstruction conviction, the 
prosecution needed to prove only that Defendant "knew or should have 
known" of the severity of the offense she obstructed. See Bingham, 575 P.2d at 
199. Therefore, a mistake of fact defense with respect to this finding was 
unavailable. Consequently, Defendant could not show that her counsel was 
ineffective for conceding that the defense did not apply. 
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C. The lack of a mistake of fact instruction was harmless because 
the evidence that Defendant knew that a listed felony had 
occurred was overwhelming. 
In any event, any error was harmless. An error is harmless when, absent 
the error, there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome; or, in 
other words, the Court's confidence in the outcome is not undermined. See 
State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ,I99, 747 Utah Adv. Rep. 10. Defendant has not 
shown a reasonable likelihood that a mistake of fact instruction would have 
produced an acquittal. 
Even if the jury should have been instructed that it could not convict 
unless Defendant knew-rather than just should have known-that one of the 
(?) listed first degree felonies had occurred, overwhehning evidence established 
that Defendant possessed that knowledge. As explained in Point I.D.2, the 
evidence established that Defendant knew that a murder, an aggravated 
robbery, or a discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily injury had occurred. 
Defendant admitted that she thought the victim was getting robbed, and that 
she saw the flashes of gunshots. R185:65. The undisputed evidence also 
showed that Defendant suspected the victim had been killed and that she was 
told he had been shot six times. R185:41. 
In light of this overwhelming evidence, there is no reasonable probability 
that, even with a mistake of fact instruction, the jury would not have found that 
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Defendant knew a murder, aggravated robbery, or discharge of a firearm 
causing serious bodily injury had occurred. Therefore, any error in not giving 
Defendant's mistake of fact instruction was harmless. See Perea, 2013 UT 68, 
if99. 
III. 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT 
MAKING A MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED ON 
AN ALLEGED INSUFFICIENCY IN THE EVIDENCE7 
Defendant argues that her counsel was also ineffective for not moving for 
a directed verdict or otherwise challenging the sufficiency of the State's 
evidence. Br.Aplt. 34. Relying on State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1983), 
Defendant argues that the State did not introduce usufficient evidence to prove 
that [she] specifically intended to obstruct justice" because the evidence did not 
'"admit of no other hypothesis than of guilt."' Br.Aplt. 35 (citing Castonguay, 
663 P.2d at 1326). 
This Court should not consider this claim because Defendant has not 
properly marshaled the evidence. But even if this Court were to excuse 
Defendant's marshaling failure, her claim nevertheless fails because it is based 
on an incorrect sufficiency standard. When viewed under the correct standard, 
7 This Point responds to Defendant's Point IV. 
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the evidence was more than sufficient to persuade a reasonable attorney that a 
~ motion for directed verdict would have been futile. 
A. Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence. 
Defendant recognizes that she must marshal the evidence in order to 
challenge her counsel's lack of objection to the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Br.Aplt. 34; see also State v. Harrison, 2012 UT App 261, 110 n.3, 286 P.3d 1272 
("When challenging the sufficiency of evidence, the challenging party has a 
duty to 'marshal all record evidence that supports' a court's ruling that there is 
sufficient evidence.") (quoting Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9)). She has not done so, 
however, because she ignores several important facts. This Court may reject 
~ her claim on this ground alone. See State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, 126, 69 P.3d 
1278. 
Marshaling is an "arduous and painstaking" process. West Valley v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). It requires defendants to 
"present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists," and then, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdicts, it requires defendants to "ferret out a fatal flaw." Id.; see also United 
Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, if if 26-27; 
~ 140 P.3d 1200. Defendant has done neither. 
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Defendant purports to marshal the evidence in two paragraphs of her 
brief. Br.Aplt. 34-35. Her summary of the evidence, however, omits several 
important facts, including: 
• The church parking lot was lit by several large street lights and other 
lighting illuminated the church grounds and building. R184:59-61,67,77-
78;R185:58-59;SE2(C),17. 
• Defendant was sitting in an Xterra only four or five feet away from and 
looking down into the Malibu. R184:18,25,91,121-23;R185:39;SE6,10,13, 
22,23. 
• The officers who first arrived on the scene within minutes of the shooting 
could II clearly" see from about ten feet away that there was blood on the 
victim, that he had suffered gunshot wounds, and that he had been the 
victim of a violent crime. R184:25-26,43-44;R185:39. 
• Defendant admitted that she wondered what was taking the victim so 
long to complete the drug deal and she looked over and II saw a struggle 
going on inside the car." R185:64-65. 
• After the shooting, Defendant rolled down her window, called some of 
the perpeh·ators by name, and directed Ll-iem to get into the Xterra. 
R184:131-32;R185:16,30,40-42. 
• After the shooting Defendant was exclaiming "[W]hat have you guys 
done?" and "Oh my God." R184:131. 
• Defendant stopped in the church parking lot to pick up Corona, the only 
perpetrator who had a gun, and dropped him off first. R184:57-58,63,75-
77;R185:16,55. 
• The conversation as Defendant drove the four away from the murder 
scene was jovial, Corona and Garza were friendly and joking with each 
other, no one threatened Defendant, and Defendant never saw a gun. 
R185:15-l 7,52-53,66. 
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• Defendant admitted that she did not fear the perpetrators after she 
recognized them. R185:66. 
• Defendant admitted that she viewed herself as "a second mom to some 
of" the perpetrators. R185:66. 
• Defendant twice told the Detective that she did not have a cellphone. 
R185:64,69. 
Because Defendant ignores this significant evidence that supports the jury 
verdict, she has not carried her marshaling burden. See Majestic Inv. Co., 818 
P.2d at 1315. 
Defendant's analysis of the evidence is also flawed because she fails to 
view it in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Instead, she argues the 
evidence from only her point of view, concluding that it was insufficient 
because a reasonable juror could have found that she did not know that a crime 
had been committed and therefore did not act with the specific intent to 
obstruct justice. Br.Aplt. 36-39. Because Defendant has not properly marshaled 
or analyzed the evidence, this Court should decline to review this claim. See 
Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, if 26. 
B. Defendant has not shown that her counsel was ineffective for not 
moving for a directed verdict. 
Alternatively, Defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails because a 
reasonable attorney could have believed that a motion for a directed verdict 
VJJ would have been futile. Defendant's claim that such a motion would have-been 
successful is flawed because it is based on an incorrect sufficiency standard. 
"When properly viewed, the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom 
were more than sufficient to survive a directed verdict motion. 
To survive a motion for direct verdict, the prosecution need only produce 
"'believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged."' State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, if38, 70 P.3d 111 (quoting State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ,r 13, 
20 P.3d 300). "When evaluating whether the State produced sufficient 
'believable evidence' to withstand a challenge at the close of the State's case in 
chief [i.e., a motion for a directed verdict], [Utah appellate courts] apply the 
same standard used when reviewing a jury verdict." Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, if 41. 
"In reviewing a jury verdict, an appellate court looks at the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn in the light most favorable to the verdict." 
State v. Mangum, 2013 UT App 292, ,I2, 749 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (citing State v. 
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ,r 40, 52 P.3d 1194); see also State v. Royball, 689 P.2d 
1338, 1339 (Utah 1984). The evidence was sufficient under this standard. 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient because it did not 
show that she knew that a crime had been committed. Br.Aplt. at 36. On the 
contrary, as detailed in Point I.D.2., the prosecution introduced believable 
evidence that Defendant knew that a murder, aggravated robbery, or at the 
very least, discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily injury had occurred. 
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This evidence, when properly viewed in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, provided believable evidence that Defendant knew a crime had 
occurred. It also provided believable evidence that Defendant acted with the 
"intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person regarding" this criminal 
conduct. See UTAH CODE ANN. §76-8-306(1). Therefore, Defendant cannot show 
that her trial counsel performed deficiently for not moving for a directed 
verdict. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, if 26, 1 P.3d 546 (counsel is not deficient 
for not making a futile motion). 
Moreover, because the evidence sufficed, Defendant cannot show that she 
was prejudiced. She cannot show that, had counsel moved for a directed 
verdict, the court would have grant~d the motion or that the outcome would 
~ have been different. See Sfrickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Defendant maintains that her counsel could have succeeded on a motion 
for directed verdict because, under Castonguay, the State's evidence did not 
'" admit of no other hypothesis than of guilt."' Br.Aplt. 35 (citing Castonguay, 
663 P.2d at 1326). But the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that Castonguay 
does not state the standard for a evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence 
challenge. See State v. Royball, 689 P.2d 1338, 1339-40 (Utah 1984). Rather, as 
explained, the correct standard for evaluating a motion for direct verdict is 
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whether the prosecution produced '"believable evidence of all the elements of 
the crime charged."' Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ,I38 (quoting Clark, 2001 UT 9, ifl3). 
The Utah Supreme Court clarified in Royball that Castonguay does not 
state the standard for a evaluating a sufficiency challenge. See Royball, 689 P.2d 
at 1339-40. The Royball court explained that the evidence in Castonguay was 
insufficient because there was no evidence of intent at all, not because the 
evidence did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Royball, 
689 P.2d at 1339-40. Castonguay was convicted of attempted first degree 
murder of a police officer based only on evidence that the police heard him fire 
a shot. 663 P.2d at 1326. There was no evidence that anyone saw Defendant 
aim his rifle at an officer. Id. The Royball court explained that it reversed 
Castonguay's conviction "because there was neither direct nor circumstantial 
evidence, at least one of '"'hich is necessary to sustain the attempted first-degree 
conviction, of intent to kill anyone." 689 P.2d at 1339. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified that specific intent can 
be proven by circumstantial evidence alone. For example, the court has held 
that the specific intent for burglary-intent to commit a theft-"can be inferred 
from conduct and attendant circumstances in the light of human behavior and 
experience." State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1981), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994)). Likewise, in a 
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murder case where the defendant contested the sufficiency of the evidence that 
he intentionally or knowingly killed his son, the court recognized that it "is well 
established that intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence" and is often 
~ "of necessity proven by circumstantial evidence" because direct evidence of 
intent is so difficult to produce. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991). 
Moreover, as this Court has recognized, the evidence need not exclude every 
reasonable hypothesis in order to be sufficient because "the Utah Supreme 
Court has ruled that despite the existence of theoretically 'reasonable' 
hypotheses, it is within the province of the jury to judge the credibility of the 
testimony, assign weight to the evidence, and reject these alternative 
hypotheses." State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 694-95 (Utah App. 1995) (citing 
State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246, 247 (1970)). 
In sum, Defendant's ineffectiveness claim is flawed because it is based on 
an incorrect standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. Because a 
reasonable attorney could have believed that the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences therefrom, when properly viewed under the correct standard, 
constituted believable evidence of all of the elements of obstruction, Defendant 
has not shown that her counsel was ineffective for not moving for a directed 
verdict. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-94. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on January 15, 2014. 
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UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-8-306 (West Supp. 2013). Obstruction of justice in 
criminal investigations or proceedings -- Elements -- Penalties -- Exceptions. 
(1) An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to hinder, 
delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or 
punishment of any person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense: 
(a) provides any person with a weapon; 
(b) prevents by force, intimidation, or deception, any person from 
performing any act that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person; 
(c) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other thing; 
( d) makes, presents, or uses any item or thing known by the actor to be false; 
(e) harbors or conceals a person; 
(f) provides a person with transportation, disguise, or other means of 
avoiding discovery or apprehension; 
(g) warns any person of impending discovery or apprehension; 
(h) warns any person of an order authorizing the interception of wire 
communications or of a pending application for an order authorizing the 
interception of wire communications; 
(i) conceals information that is not privileged and that concerns the offense, 
after a judge or magistrate has ordered the actor to provide the information; 
or 
G) provides false information regarding a suspect, a witness, the conduct 
constituting an offense, or any other material aspect of the investigation. 
(2) (a) As used in this section, "conduct that constitutes a criminal offense" 
means conduct that would be punishable as a crime and is separate from a 
violation of this section, and includes: 
(i) any violation of a criminal statute or ordinance of this state, its political 
subdivisions, any other state, or any district, possession, or territory of 
the United States; and 
(ii) conduct committed by a juvenile which would be a crime if 
committed by an adult. 
(b) A violation of a criminal statute that is committed in another state, or any 
district, possession, or territory of the United States, is a: 
(i) capital felony if the penalty provided includes death or life 
imprisonment without parole; 
(ii) a first degree felony if the penalty provided includes life 
imprisonment with parole or a maximum term of imprisonment 
exceeding 15 years; 
(iii) a second degree felony if the penalty provided exceeds five years; 
(iv) a third degree felony if the penalty provided includes imprisonment 
for any period exceeding one year; and 
(v) a misdemeanor if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any 
period of one year or less. · 
(3) Obstruction of justice is: 
(a) a second degree felony if the conduct which constitutes an offense would 
be a capital felony or first degree felony; 
(b) a third degree felony if: 
(i) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be a second or third 
degree felony and the actor violates Subsection (l)(b), (c), (d), (e), or (f); 
(ii) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be any offense other 
than a capital or first degree felony and the actor violates Subsection 
(l)(a); 
(iii) the obstruction of justice is presented or committed before a court of 
law; or 
(iv) a violation of Subsection (l)(h); or 
(c) a class A misdemeanor for any violation of this section that is not 
enumerated under Subsection (3)(a) or (b). 
(4) It is not a defense that the actor was unaware of the level of penalty for the 
conduct constituting an offense. 
(5) Subsection (l)(e) does not apply to harboring a youth offender, which is 
governed by Section 62A-7-402. 
(6) Subsection (l)(b) does not apply to: 
(a) tampering with a juror, which is governed by Section 76-8-508.5; 
(b) influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a judge or member of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole, which is governed by Section 76-8-316; 
Q 
( c) tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving a bribe, which is 
governed by Section 76-8-508; 
(d) retaliation against a witness, victim, or informant, which is governed by 
Section 76-8-508.3; or 
( e) extortion or bribery to dismiss a criminal proceeding, which is governed 
by Section 76-8-509. 
(7) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), (2), or (3), an actor commits a third degree 
felony if the actor harbors or conceals an offender who has escaped from official 
custody as defined in Section 76-8-309. 
~ Amended by Chapter 213, 2009 General Session 
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A person cannot be found guilty of a criminal offense unless that person's conduct is 
prohibited by law, AND at the time the conduct occurred, the defendant demonstrated a particular 
mental state specified by law, 
"Conduct" can mean both an "act" or the failure to act when the law requires a person to acL 
All "act" is a voluntary movement of the body and it can include speech. 
As to the "mental state" requirement, the prosecution must prove that at the time the 
defendant acted ( or failed to act), he/she did so with a particular mental state. For each offense, the 
law defines what kind of mental state the defendant bad to have, if any. For some crimes the 
defendant must have acted "intentionally" or icknowingly." For other crimes it is enough that the 
defendant acted "recklessly," with "criminal negligence," or with some other specified mental state. 
Later I will instruct you on the specific conduct and mental state that the prosecution must 
prove before the defendant can be found guilty of the crime(s) charged. 
I \I" 
/ 
INSTRUCTION NO. _!.i. 
AJ I stated in another instruction, the prosecution must prove that at the time the defendant 
acted, he/she did so with a particular mental state. For each offense, the law defines what kind of 
mental state the defendant had to have, if any. 
For the crime(s) charged in this case, the defendant must have acted .. intentionally" or 
"knowingly'' or recklessly. The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant acted intentionally or knowingly or recklessly before the defendant can be found guilty 
of the crime charged. 
A person engages in conduct intentionally or with intent or willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct lmowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his 
conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's st.andpoint 
INSTRUCTION NO. _jJ_ 
The law requires that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
acted with a particular mental state. 
Ordinarily, there is no way that a defendant's mental state can be proven directly, because 
no one can tell what another person is thinking. 
A defendant's mental state can be proved indirectly from the SUITounding mets and 
circumstances. This includes things like what the defendant said, w~at the defendant did, and any 
other evidence that shows what was in the defendant's mind. 
1 l~ G 
INSTRUCTION NO. J1_ 
A defendant's "mental state" is not the same as "motive." Motive is why a person docs 
something. Motive is not an element of the crime(s) charged in this case. ~ a result, the prosecutor 
does not have to prove why the defendant acted { or failed to act). 
However, motive or lack of motive may help you dctennine iftbe defendant did what he/she 
is charged with doing. It may also help you determine what hi&/her mental state was at the time. 
INTENT INFERRED FRO¥ ACTS INSTRUCTION NO. If 
You must decide whether the defense of compulsion applies in this case. Under that defense, a person is 
not guilty of a crime if she acted because she was coerced to do so by: 
• Someone's use of unlawful force against her or someone else; or 
• Someone's threat to use imminent unlawful force against her or someone else. 
The use or threatened use of force must be such that a person of reasonable firmness in defendant's 
situation would not have resisted. 
The defense of compulsion is not available if the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly placed 
herself in a situation where it was probable that she would be subjected to duress. 
The defendant is not required to prove the defense applies. Rather, the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. The State has the burden of proof at all times. If the 




INSTRUCTION NO. __ ( 1-
Before you can convict the defendant, Benita Kennedy, of the offense of 
Obstruction Of Justice as charged in the Information, you must find from all of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt a11 of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 10th day of December, 2011, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the defendant, Benita Kennedy; 
2. With the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, 
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person regarding a criminal 
offense; 
3. Did one or more of the following: 
(a) altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed any item or other thing; or 
(b) harbored or concealed a person; or 
(c) provided a person with transportation, disguise, or other means of 
avoiding discovery or apprehension; or 
( d) warned any person of impending discovery or apprehension; or 
(e) provided false infonnation regarding a suspect, a witness, the conduct 
constituting an offense, or any other material aspect of the investigation; 
and 
4. She knew or should have known the criminal offense was either criminal 
homicide murder, aggravated robbery, or discharge of a fireann causing serious bodily 
injury. 
After you carefully consider all the evidence in this case, if you are convinced that 
each and every element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find 
the defendant GUILTY of Obstruction of Justice, as charged in Count I of the 
Information. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that one or more of these 
. . 
.... 
elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
NOT GUILTY of Count I of the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. l,A 
Definition of a "party". A person can commit a crime as a "party." In other 
words, a person can commit a criminal offense even though that person did not 
personally do all of the acts that make up the offense. Every person, acting with the 
mental state required for the commission of the offense, who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another 
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a 
"party" for such conduct. 
Mere presence or even knowledge does not make a person a party to the charged 
offense. Something more than a person's presence during the commission of a crime is 
required to constitute "encouragement" so as to impose accomplice liability. There must 
be evidence showing that a person engaged in some active behavior or at least speech or 
some other kind of expression that served to assist or encourage the commission of the 
charged offense. 
INSTRUCTION NO. l:I 
"Encouraged" means to instigate; to incite to action; to embolden; to help. 
When determining whether the defendant was acting as a "party," the defendant's 
presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances 
from which her participation in the criminal intent may be inferred. 
I f' t J 
INSTRUCTION NO. tt-
Under the laws of the State of Utah, Criminal Homicide Murder means: 
1) intentionally or knowingly causing the death of another; or 
2) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act 
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; or 
3) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the 
actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another 
and thereby causes the death of another; or 
4) 
a) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate 
flight from the commission or attempted commission of Aggravated Robbery 
or Discharge of a Firearm causing serious bodily injury, or is a party to one of 
those offenses; and 
b) a person other than a party is killed in the course of the commission, 
attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted 
commission of Aggravated Robbery or Discharge of a Firearm causing serious 
bodily injury; and 
c) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of Aggravated Robbery 
or Discharge of a Firearm causing serious bodily injmy. 
INSTRUCTION NO. l, 
Under the laws of the State of Utah, Felony Discharge of a Fireann causing 
serious bodily injury occurs when; 
I) A person; 
a) discharged a firearm in the direction of any person or persons, 
knowing or having reason to believe that any person may be 
endangered by the discharge of the firearm; or 
b) discharged a firearm in the direction of any vehicle with the intent 
to intimidate or harass another; and 
2) caused bodily injury that created or caused serious pennanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impainnent of the function of any 






INSTRUCTION NO. l, '1 
Under the laws of the State of Utah, an Aggravated Robbery means to unlawfully 
and intentionally take, or attempt to talce, personal property in the possession of another 
from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and 
with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal 
property; or to intentionally or knowingly use force, or fear of immediate force, against 
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THE COURT: All right, I'll excuse you for lunch. 
I ask you to return at 2:00. Please again do not speak with 
anyone or among yourselves about this case. Do not form or 
express an opinion until you've heard all the evidence and my 
final instructions to you and the final arguments of counsel. 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom). 
THE COURT: All right, tell me what's ahead, Mr. 
Berceau, relative to your case. You indicated that you do not 
intend to call Ms. Fernandez back? 
MR. BERCEAU: No, the only thing I intend to do, 
Your Honor, was to offer Exhibit No. 3 into evidence. 
THE COURT: Any objection to that? 
MR. FLATER: What -
THE COURT: It's the affidavit from Mr. 
(inaudible) . 
MR. FLATER: No objection. 
THE COURT: Okay, that is admitted. 
{Defendant's Exhibit 3 received) 
THE COURT: Have you talked to your client about 
testifying and appraised her of her right to testify, also of 
her right not to testify? 
MR. BERCEAU: I have, Your Honor, I'd like to take 
some time to talk to her. 
THE COURT: Okay, why don't you take her back. 
Let's do jury instructions now. 
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MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, can I step out and notify 
Ms. Fernandez that she can be excused. She's been waiting -
MR. BERCEAU: Yes. 
THE COURT: Any problem with that? That's fine. 
MR. BERCEAU: I'm not going to call her. 
THE COURT: Objections then to State's 
instructions? 
MR. BERCEAU: There are, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Tell me what they are. 
MR. BERCEAU: Let me pull one out and see the 
specific objection to it. 
MR. FLATER: Ms. Johnson is going to argue the jury 
instructions so if we could wait until she is present. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. FLATER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's start with the 
state's instructions, Mr. Berceau. 
MR. BERCEAU: May I approach, Your Honor, there's 
no number on it specify, I'll point out to you what I object 
to. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BERCEAU: This instruction that says in concert 
with two or more persons means regarding the intend. 
THE COURT: All right. This is I believe it's the 
































means the defendant has aided or encouraged, was aided or 
encouraged by at least two other persons in committing the 
offense and was aware this aid or encouragement and each of 
the other persons was physically present or participated as a 
party to the underlying crime. And the objection? 
MR. BERCEAU: I don't have a objection to what you 
just read. My objection is I need to, from the case in point 
says on the statute, the statute is set up, it says 1-A, a 
person who commits any offense listed in sub 4 is subject to 
an enhanced (inaudible) offense provided in subsection 3 if 
the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
persons acted in concert with two or more persons. So that's 
one of the elements that's covered by the other instruction. 
And Bit says, "In concert with two or more ·persons 
as used in this section means the defendant was aided or 
encouraged by at least two other persons in committing the 
offense and was aware he was so aided or encouraged in each 
of the persons; (i) was physically present or (ii) 
participated as a party to the offense." 
And then the section that they brought in about 
intent is part of the code and it applies only to (i). It 
doesn't apply to parties that are physically present. It 
says for purposes of subsection B, or 1-B (i) other persons 
participating as parties may not have the intent to engage in 
the same offense or degree of offense as the defendant and 
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then it talks about the (inaudible) after that. That intent 
only goes specifically to this one part of the code and we're 
dealing with parties that are physically present and there's 
no evidence of obstruction or other parties not physically 
being present in this case. So that (i) about intent doesn't 
apply and we're left back - I can give the Court the code, I 
have a copy of it here. So this part about intent only is 
applicable to 76-3-203(8) (1-B} (ii) not that they're 
physically present. So we've really got a question of these 
aiders and abetters or whether there's more than two of them. 
THE COURT: So what's the issue? I'm really at a 
loss. 
MR. BERCEAU: They are presenting an instruction 
that says in concert with two or more persons means regarding 
intent, the other persons participating as parties need not 
have the intent to engage in this same offense or degree of 
offenses as the defendant. That does not apply -
THE COURT: I'm not seeing that jury instruction. 
Mine reads differently. 
MR. BERCEAU: This is the one they've given to me. 
THE COURT: Yes. Ms. Johnson, I'm seeing a 
different jury instruction here as I read it. There's no 
intent language in the one I have. 
MR. BERCEAU: They emailed me this. This is -



























concert with two or more persons means, which is what we've 
submitted. 
MR. BERCEAU: Right. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Will you show her the one you've 
got and see if this is the one she submitted. 
MR. BERCEAU: They submitted this one. 
THE COURT: There was an amended set of 
instructions that came in. 
MS. JOHNSON: The one we sent you. 
THE COURT: This is the one I have. 
MR. BERCEAU: We only have one. 
THE COURT: This is the one I have. 
MR. BERCEAU: As long as they're not -
THE COURT: Are there objections to that? 
MS. JOHNSON: Mr. Berceau, here's a copy so that 
you're working off the same ones. You're probably going to -
you're talking about objecting to that jury instruction, I'm 
going to anticipate. There's that jury instruction and then 
there's -
MR. BERCEAU: So you're not giving this one 
anymore? I can pull that. 
MS. JOHNSON: I'm not going to talk about whether 
we pulled it or not. I mean, the one that we submitted to 
the Court is this one right here so this right here is -




























(inaudible) instead of what you emailed me. 
MS. JOHNSON: Here's a clean copy. That is what we 
emailed you. 
THE COURT: So in concert with two or more persons 
means, one, the defendant was aided and encouraged. That's 
the language I read and you said you did not object to. 
MR. BERCEAU: I do not object to that, no. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any other instructions that you 
object to? 
MR. BERCEAU: Yes, I object to the instruction that 
says, ~For purposes of determining whether defendant 
committed the crime of obstruction of justice in concern with 
two or more persons are instructed that other persons 
participating as parties need not have the intent to engage 
in the same offense or degree of offenses as the defendant." 
That's again if you look at the statute, that intent doesn't 
apply to people that are actually present, Your Honor, that 
only applies to people who are not present and to be an aider 
and abetter you have to have the same intent. 
MS. JOHNSON: I'm still not clear on what Mr. 
Berceau is saying. 
THE COURT: I'm not either but I thought maybe you 
were -
MS. JOHNSON: - following it. 
THE COURT: I'm not following it either. 
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MR. BERCEAU: My problem is they put in language 
about intent here, Your Honor, that's not correct. They've 
taken the intent language from a provision of the code that 
doesn't apply in this fact situation. The fact situation 
under that code are for people who are not phys1cally 
present. Those are for other people somewhere else who have 
participated under Code Provision 1-B(ii) and then you turn 
the page and under (i) it gives this intent that they're 
reciting that implies something different. Someone who aides 
and encourages has to have the same intent, Your Honor, and 
whose physically present. 
THE COURT: What? Could you just repeat that? I'm 
not getting the argument. 
MR. BERCEAU: Okay. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry. Just walk me through this. 
MR. BERCEAU: Can I give you a copy of the code? 
THE COURT: I have a copy of the code, yes. 
MR. BERCEAU: Will you follow me to B? 
THE COURT: B, Subsection (ii)? 
MR. BERCEAU: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Participated as a party to an offense 
listed in Subsection 4 which is a laundry list, okay. 
MR. BERCEAU: Correct. 
THE COURT: And where is the language that you say 





























MR. BERCEAU: The language of the intent issue is 
on Page 140, the back page. You've got to look down at 
B(ii), it says participated as a party to any offense listed 
in Subsection 4. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BERCEAU: And right above that it says, is 
physically present or participated as a party and then down 
below it says for purpose of 1-B{ii) which is right above it-
MS. JOHNSON: And Your Honor -
MR. BERCEAU: - participated -
MS. JOHNSON: Sorry. I just want to double check 
what version of the code Mr. Berceau is using 'cause I 
printed one off of West Law last night and it's not reading 
the same as the one Mr. Berceau has. 
MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, my objection is the 
intent is of an aider and abetter, Your Honor -
THE COURT: If the language is different -
MR. BERCEAU: If it is, (inaudible) they can show 
me right now. When I initially planned and pulled this I was 
working off a different jury instruction I had received. 
THE COURT: Okay, there's an amendment in the year 
2011 in the most current code that I have which is the 2012 
code. 



























similar but I'm reading Subsection C, just defines in concert 
with two or more person means regarding intent and then it 
lists the statutory language. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. JOHNSON: But I don't see anywhere where it 
specifically is referring to a prior code section or a prior 
sub part. 
THE COURT: I think it's a cosmetic change. It 
appears to be the same language otherwise but with that 
language, Mr. Berceau -
MR. BERCEAU: With that change, there goes - and 
the change of the jury instruction I would submit that that 
jury instruction complies with that statute. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any other problems with the 
state's instructions? 
MR. BERCEAU: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's then look at Mr. Berceau's 
two instructions. 
Ms. Johnson? 
MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, it's my understanding 
that Mr. Berceau is submitting a compulsion instruction. 
This morning he handed me a modified one which appears to 
follow directly to MUJI and so I have no objection to that 
one. 






























and so far I'm not hearing any evidence. I mean, are you 
objecting to it being given anyway? 
MS. JOHNSON: I don't believe that there's any 
compulsion evidence so I'm objecting in general but as to its 
form -
THE COURT: It is the correct -
MS. JOHNSON: - MUJI -
THE COURT: - one and it was recently amended after 
some case law. 
MS. JOHNSON: Correct, and so underneath the - so 
as to form, that intending the MUJI one and I have no 
objection to the form. I don't believe there's been 
sufficient evidence for compulsion. 
And then with regards to the second argument on the 
mistake of fact, again, I don't believe there's a legal basis 
to give that, the mistake of fact instruction and, in fact, 
in the recent case State v. Marchette, the court recognized 
that the defendant's knowledge, if it's part of the elements 
of the offense which it's my understanding the reason he's 
giving it to say she didn't know that the crime had been 
committed but the elements of the offense is we have to prove 
that she knew or should have known a crime had been 
committed. To whereas as an element of the offense, it's not 
a mistake of fact as an affirmative defense and I don't see 




























THE COURT: Mr. Berceau? 
MR. BERCEAU: Your Honor, in preparing that 
instruction I was troubled with the fact that we have the 
knowledge requirement in the elements. But then "should have 
known" part, the "should have known" seems to - a person can 
have a mistake but they should have known something. If they 
knew something then there's goes that -
THE COURT: "Should have known" negates this, 
correct? 
MR. BERCEAU: Well, I don't think "should have 
known" negates it. I think knowledge negates it. 
THE COURT: But "should have known" is an element 
of the offense that you're not objecting to -
MR. BERCEAU: Correct. 
THE COURT: - correct in the elements instruction 
so this is not applicable. So are you withdrawing it? 
MR. BERCEAU: I would just rather have the Court 
rule it's not going to go into the record. 
THE COURT: Okay. I will - I'll make my record as 
clearly as I can that based on the element of ~known or 
should have known" that you've agreed is an accurate 
statement of the law. This is not an appropriate 
instruction. Okay. So ... 
MR. BERCEAU: Did the Court want some argument on 



























THE COURT: I'm inclined to give it based on the 
general - I would - ~ 
MR. BERCEAU: Then I won't argue it. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I think you can argue to the 
jury that it's just not applicable or it's applicable. 
Now, is she going to testify? 
MR. BERCEAU: I haven't gotten a chance to talk to 
her. We went over the jury instructions first. 
THE COURT: Okay. Will you please let me know? 
One of the thirigs I need to be doing is getting the jury 
instructions put together and ·that includes whether or not 
she's going to testify and you're familiar with my stocks. 
I'll go through them and try to splice these together. 
Now, let me ask you this, do you want different, do 
you want a second set of instructions about in concert? Do 
you want to bifurcate that? The way these are put together 
now they're not going to be bifurcated and I don't know that 
there's any prejudice one way or another. 
MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I would ask that we just 
pull the instructions that apply to the "in concert" so those 
two instructions-
Just the two, right? 
MR. BERCEAU: Yeah. 
MS. JOHNSON: - that dealt with the group 
enhancement and then if the jury does return a verdict of 
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acquittal we don't have to worry about it; if they return a 
verdict of guilty then we'll give them the new instructions 
on this is what in concert, group enhancement means and then 
go from there. 
THE COURT: Okay, tell me ... 
MS. JOHNSON: And with regard to the defendant 
testifying or not testifying, I believe the Court has the 
stock and the State has no objection to that. 
THE COURT: Yeah, it's just a question of me 
pulling - because I photocopy them so that the jurors can 
read along with them. Will you please tell me - will you 
please pull out then, Ms. Johnson, from yours - it appears 
that the "in concert" may cover more than two instructions. 
Will you just pull these out? They're a little bit -
MR. FLATER: Can I take yours? 
THE COURT: I think they're entirely consistent. 
Some of the language, for instance, appears, it says if you 
find the defendant guilty of obstruction of justice then you 
must determine if it's in concert; but if we don't do these 
instructions until after the verdict on Count 1, the language 
would be, you have found the defendant. You understand the 
difference? 
MS. JOHNSON: Correct. 
MR. FLATER: I think we were planning on a 
bifurcated trial and we prepared that. 
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THE COURT: I don't care if we bifurcate it or not 
but if we bifurcate it I want it to be bifurcated. 
MS. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: If you could take a look at these. 
(Inaudible conversation). 
THE COURT: Do you have it because this one has a 
he/she and I'd rather have it she. 
MS. JOHNSON: Correct. No, but I can type one up 
and email it to your clerk so you'll have one that's ready to 
go. 
THE COURT: Yeah, I was just asking her if she can 
get into that. I don't know if it's one that's amendable. 
MR. BERCEAU: 
change he to she. 
THE COURT: 
I saved it as a Word, so I could 
I'm not being able to get into our 
website for some reason to get to that instruction. So if 
you could correct - yeah, if I could get a clean copy and if 
you will take a look at these and pull out the ones that are-
MS. JOHNSON: Here's the set. I pulled out the 
compulsion one that we had in there. I'm going to just take 
these so nothing gets mixed up with that. 
THE COURT: Okay. So these are all of the ones 
that -do not include the -
MS. JOHNSON: The group enhancement. 
THE COURT: - group enhancement. 
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MS. JOHNSON: Yes, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay, and I'll pull these together. I 
will ask that you be available. I'm going to now go out and 
splice these together and I want you to look at these. I 
mean, I can adjust to the defendant testifying one fairly 
readily but the sooner the better. 
MR. BERCEAU: My thoughts are she wasn't going to 
testify but she kind of wavered so I need to talk to her. 
THE COURT: That's fine. If you'll just let me 
know, it's really for me, it's a logistical thing. I really 
hate keeping juries waiting and I've done it way to long this 
morning, hour and a half already. So I really want to 
minimize that if possible. That's my position here. 
MR. BERCEAU: Back at two, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Beg pardon? 
MR. BERCEAU: Back at two? 
THE COURT: Quarter of for you and let us know, 
just in case I need to talk to you about things and if you 
will let me know, that will be great. 




























MS. JOHNSON: And should I email those to Shantee 
THE COURT: That would be good. 
(Whereupon a noon recess was taken) 
MR. BERCEAU: I guess we'll need her here. 
THE COURT: I don't know. I mean, I can bring her 
in now or later. 
MR. BERCEAU: I think it would be best to just 
before the jury comes in to bring her in and put it on the 
record. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Berceau, off the record 
we spoke about whether or not Ms. Kennedy is intending to 
testify. You indicated that she has opted not to, correct? 
MR. BERCEAU: Yes, Your Honor, my client has 
indicated she has opted not to testify. I've explained to 
her her rights to testify here and potential consequences if 
she does or if she doesn't. 
THE COURT: ~11 right. Ms. Kennedy, have you had 
sufficient time to speak with your attorney about that? 
DEFENDANT KENNEDY: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's your decision then? 
DEFENDANT KENNEDY: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right, thanks. 





An act committed under an ignorance or mistake of fact, 
which disproves the culpable mental state, is a defense 
to any prosecution for the crime. 
Therefore, you are instructed that it is a defense to 
the charge of Obstruction of Justice, if the defendant 
had an honest belief that the following crimes had not 
occurred 1. Criminal Homicide murder, 2. Aggravated 
Robbery, 3. Discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily 
injury. 
A defendant does not have the burden to establish she 
had an honest belief that the aforementioned crimes had 
not occurred. What a defendant must do, if the evidence 
on the part of the prosecution does not tend to show it, 
is to bring forward some evidence, which tends to show 
that she had an honest belief that the aforementioned 
crimes had not occurred. 
If evidence exists indicating the Defendant had an 
honest though mistaken belief that the aforementioned 
crimes had not occurred, then the prosecution must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act 
under a mistaken belief of fact. If the prosecution does 
not meet its burden, then the defendant is entitled to a~ 
acquittal and must be found Not Guilty. 


